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Introduction
Transaction costs can decrease the economic efficiency of emissions trading systems substantially, especially if they cause irregular cost burdens among regulated companies. The attention for transaction costs in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has increased in recent years. So far, the literature principally focuses on transaction costs for allowance trading, while the impact of administrative transaction costs is underexposed. Administrative costs occur as a result of mandatory compliance obligations, i.e. monitoring, reporting, and verification of annual emissions (MRV). Accurate reporting and a verification of emissions are indispensable for the proper functioning of emissions trading programmes or carbon taxes. Hence, administrative costs for MRV are to some degree unavoidable. Recognising the importance of accurate MRV for the proper functioning of systems, such as the EU ETS, the next question to ask is if administrative costs, among other things, should be regarded as an important issue for policy design. Thus, there is a trade-off between aspects of MRV transaction costs on the one hand and necessary MRV obligations on the other hand. Both aspects need to be considered for the design of emissions trading systems. This paper investigates the impact of MRV transaction costs on the efficiency of the EU ETS empirically by using a unique set of administrative compliance data which are linked to firmlevel survey data. The effects of MRV transaction costs are relevant in two aspects, namely with respect to marginal transaction costs and with respect to average transaction costs. Non-zero marginal costs could cause disadvantages for the overall economic efficiency of the EU ETS since they would affect the output decisions of regulated companies (Mundaca, Mansoz, Neij, & Timilsina, 2013) . Substantial differences in average costs (e.g. as a result of high fixed transaction costs) would imply economies of scale in the MRV process and could cause high administrative costs per unit of emissions. In order to shed light on the question of whether or not MRV transaction costs should be regarded as an important issue in policy design within the scope of the EU ETS, we examine if there is empirical evidence for the existence of non-zero marginal costs or of substantial differences in average costs.
The European Commission has emphasised the importance of 'administrative efficiency' in the EU ETS and aims at reducing unnecessary administrative burdens for small emitters (directive 2009/29/EC, paragraph 11). However, there is still a lack of empirical evidence regarding this 2 issue. The empirical assessment of administrative costs at the firm-level is a prerequisite for an informed policy debate and a possible future reform of the EU ETS (Joas & Flachsland, 2014, Sec. 4.3) . The insights gained from the EU ETS may also influence the design of (future) climate policy instruments other than the EU ETS. Two aspects are of particular interest in this case.
Firstly, it is essential to examine whether administrative costs are dependent on the size of regulated companies or the amount of annual emissions of companies, and secondly, to investigate if costs differ between different types of firms or industrial installations. The latter aspect has received little attention in the literature so far. This paper is organised as follows. A brief literature review is presented in Section 2. Section 3 provides a description of data, the empirical model specification, the identification strategy, and details on the proposed testable hypotheses. Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The Literature
Economic efficiency is of central interest to the design of economic instruments for climate protection. Although transaction costs are not the only aspects that have to be taken into account for policy design 1 , they are frequently discussed as an important source of excess costs under emissions trading with negative consequences for economic efficiency (Hahn & Stavins, 2011) .
However, there is still a significant lack of empirical evidence regarding the extent of transaction costs and their relevance in practice.
Most of the literature on transaction costs in emissions trading revolves around the costs for trading of allowances. Stavins (1995) shows that transaction costs for allowance trading (e.g.
trading fees) can reduce trading, and in doing so, increase overall costs and decrease economic efficiency . The initial distribution of allowances is relevant in this situation in so far that the 'independence property' is violated. 2 Trading related transaction costs are seen as having 1 Examples are the uncertainty of costs and the benefits of regulation (Hepburn, 2006) or political feasibility. The latter aspect has been of particular importance for policy choice and design in the European Union as coordination between member states and pre-existing regulations in some member states imposed a number of additional restrictions to policy choice and design (Ellerman, Convery, & De Pertuis, 2010) . 2 Montgomery (1972) showed that the initial permit distribution will not be essential for the final outcome of regulation under cap-and-trade, and that overall control costs will be unaffected by the initial allocation. The allocation of allowances, thus, is an issue related to distributional aspects but does not affect cost efficiency. This is also called the 'independence property' (Hahn & Stavins, 2011 (Joas & Flachsland, 2014, Sec. 4.3) . Kerr and Dusch (2015) consider transaction costs as part of an argument which is in favour of an upstream orientated regulation. Overall, MRV transaction costs are crucial with respect to the resulting total costs of firms caused by the EU ETS with consequences for ex-post allocation and efficiency (Mundaca et al., 2013, p. 494) .
4 investigating the extent of MRV transaction costs in the EU ETS. We examine the presence of non-zero marginal transaction costs in order to identify potential effects that MRV transaction costs might have on economic efficiency, as suggested by Mundaca et al. (2013) and Joas and Flachsland (2014) . In addition to that, we investigate average transaction costs dependent on the firm-size and firm-type in Germany in order to allow for a detailed differentiation between various kinds of MRV transaction costs in the EU ETS. To our best knowledge, there is no detailed account with respect to the effects of 'firm-types' in relation to MRV transaction costs in literature so far.
Data and Methods
Data Description
The empirical analysis is based on two data sources. The amount of annual verified emissions, the information on free allocation, the number of EU ETS installations operated by firms, and the type of installation (i.e. if combustion installation or any other type) are derived from official EU compliance data, as published in the 'European Independent Transaction Log' (EUTL, 2013).
The remaining data is collected from annual surveys of German firms in the EU ETS. Tables 1   and 2 comprise the data description and summary statistics.
The panel covers three years (2010 to 2012). Responsible managers of all EU ETS regulated companies in Germany received an online questionnaire annually in March, at a time when companies usually need to submit their compliance documents. These managers were the contact persons at the installation level, as documented in the German ETS registry. In case a company was operating more than one installation, the responsible manager of the largest installation (in terms of annual emissions) was contacted. The survey included questions about the company's main activity (economic sector based on NACE) and, in addition, discrete categories regarding the number of employees.
Every manager was asked to provide an estimation of the labour days per annum that have been spent on different categories of EU ETS related activities which might have caused transaction costs (MRV obligation, trading, general information gathering, and legal costs). Additional costs for external services related to the different activities could be reported separately, similar to the methodology applied by Ofei-Mensah and Bennett (2013) (for details on the questionnaire see 5 Appendix A1). The reported days, which were spent on management obligations related to the EU ETS, were transformed into the equivalent euro value by applying hourly wages on average for 2012.These wages differed not only between the 16 German federal states (Länder) but also between the energy sector and the producing industry sector, as reported by the German Statistical Office. 4 It was assumed that a work day comprised eight hours. All costs were inflation-adjusted to the price level of 2012. The total MRV transaction costs (variable tcMRV)
comprised labour costs and the costs of external services reported for MRV activities.
The definition of the variable tcMRV is motivated by the requirements of the MRV process. This process consists of three steps as described in the following. Firstly, installations need to monitor emissions over time. This frequently occurs by documenting fuel consumption, i.e. in the case of combustion installations. Monitoring procedures differ depending on the type of installations.
There are comprehensive guidelines provided by the German emissions trading authority (DEHSt) in which requirements and procedures are specified. Secondly, the amount of emissions needs to be annually reported until the end of March. Reporting is organised via an onlineplatform. In addition to (internal) monitoring and reporting obligations, a mandatory external verification of reported emissions is required. The reported figures need to be approved by accredited third-party consultants before the official MRV process is completed. In some cases, companies need to undergo an additional review process of the DEHSt. While monitoring and reporting principally cause internal costs (i.e. labour costs), verification causes external costs (see also Mundaca et al., 2013, p. 503) . Therefore, the questionnaire provided different sections in which labour input and external costs could be separately reported (see Appendix A1).
External consultancy costs are also mentioned as an essential cost category by Jaraite et al. (2010, p. 199) . 5 The term 'administrative transaction costs' will exclusively refer to the abovementioned transaction costs for MRV in the following.
Overall, 15% of German companies regulated by the EU ETS are covered by the survey over the course of all three years. 5 It is possible that other additional types of costs are relevant in the MRV process, for instance, costs attributable to such expenditures as office equipment, electronic devices, software and so on. As these types of costs will only be partly attributable to the MRV process and since the share of the costs attributable to the MRV process is difficult to estimate, we distance ourselves from these type of 'overhead costs' and focus on the most important cost components.
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and survey data are merged on the basis of a unique firm identification number. As official compliance data are reported at the installation level and firm survey data are collected at the company level, compliance data are aggregated to the firm level. In total, a number of 237 observations (154 firms) are available. In order to rectify a potential bias of the sample towards 'large firms', weights which also take the non-response bias into account are applied (see Appendix A2).
[ Table 1 about here] The median of total MRV costs per year for all firms in the sample amounts to 7.0 thousand euro (tEUR). For firms emitting less than 25.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts to 5.0 tEUR; for firms emitting 25.000 up to 100.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts to 6.3 tEUR; and for firms emitting more than 100.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts 12.5 tEUR. Thus, if the number of emissions per annum increases, the overall MRV costs increase simultaneously. The median of MRV costs per year and per unit of CO 2 emissions for all firms in the sample amounts to 0.17 euro (EUR). For firms emitting less than 25.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts to 0.71 EUR; for firms emitting 25.000 up to 100.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts to 0.16 EUR; and for firms emitting more than 100.000 tCO 2 p.a., it amounts to 0.03 EUR. As expected, we observe a strong 'size-effect' in MRV transaction costs per unit of emissions.
[ Figure 1 about here] Figure 1 : Scatterplot of the log of MRV transaction costs in euros (logtcMRV) and the log of verified annual emissions (logverem) which incorporates a fitted log-log pooled OLS model including an interval of 95 per cent confidence.
[ Table 2 about here] 7
Economic Background and Hypothesis
If marginal transaction costs are non-zero, the marginal (shadow) price for emissions will be altered (Mundaca et al., 2013) . Hence, transaction costs will have negative consequences for economic efficiency if marginal MRV transaction costs are dependent on a company's amount of emissions. The empirical examination of transaction costs related to MRV activities has to comprise non-zero marginal transaction costs in order to allow for a test of this hypothesis. Thus, it is assumed that function which describes MRV transaction costs is dependent on annual verified emissions of a firm. Given the parameterisation ( ) = 0 1 , which can be easily The parameters of interest are estimated for different types of firms (economic sector or installation type) and for firms of various sizes (in terms of employees). For this purpose, we introduce indicator variables ('dummies') in order to differentiate between 0 . We also introduce interaction terms with the log of annual verified emissions to differentiate 1 by firm type and size (in terms of the number of employees). Indicator variables and interaction terms are summarised in Table 2 . Based on the parameter estimates, it is possible to test for statistical differences in MRV transaction costs paid by firms of different types and sizes depending on verified emissions and other control variables.
Empirical Model
In the following step, the coefficients 0 and 1 are estimated. Taking the natural logarithm on both sides of yields a standard linear elasticity model which allows for a direct estimation of the coefficients of interest.
log( ) = log ( 0 ) + 1 log( ).
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We are interested in estimating an augmented version of (1) by using a panel model which has the general form
are the MRV transaction costs, is a set of variables which is expected to determine , is a firm-specific and unobserved effect that is either time fixed or random, and is an idiosyncratic error term. If there is no correlation between and , an estimation with random effects is the appropriate measure. The standard procedure to test whether a fixed or a random effects model has to be applied is the Hausman test. The null hypothesis is that 'no systematic difference of coefficients' exists between random and fixed effects. With a p-value of 0.68 and a
Chi-square value of 6.59, the Null cannot be rejected. Therefore, a random effects model is chosen.
Random effects models require the assumptions of strict exogeneity and orthogonality of the unobserved effect and the explanatory variables. The variance matrix must be of full rank with variance ( 2 ) = 2 for = 1, … , and serially uncorrelated idiosyncratic errors. Thus, random effects require the conditional variances and covariances to be zero, and a homoscedastic structure of the variance of the unobserved effect is needed (Wooldridge 2002, Chapter 10.4) . As visual and numerical tests on homoscedasticity of the composite error + indicate that it is likely to have a heteroscedastic pattern in the data, robust standard errors are used. To avoid serial correlation in the error terms, time dummies are added to model specifications (3) in Table   3 to test for time trends, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002, p. 261 ).
As we are interested in estimating the effect of differing levels of annual emissions on MRV transaction costs, we specify a linear elasticity panel model of the form
The model contains verified emissions log( ) as an independent variable along with a matrix of dummy variables and interaction terms which contains further firm characteristics, as reported in Table 2 (data description) and Table 3 (estimation results).
Estimation and Results
Estimation results are reported in Table 3 .
However, the results are robust for all of the reported model specifications.
[ Table 3 about here]
Fixed Transaction Costs
Differences in the level of 'fixed' transaction costs for MRV activities (viz. the costs which are independent of the amount of annual emissions) are identified by indicator variables and a constant. In this respect, the most important results are the observed effects for small companies (1 to 249 employees, variable dsma) and utility companies (variable dutility). Small companies face larger fixed MRV transaction costs when compared to other types of companies, whereas utility companies face lower fixed MRV transaction costs. Sector indicator variables for glass production, paper production, the chemical industry, and for combustion installations are not statistically different from zero. There are no significant effects for medium sized companies (250 to 1000 employees) when compared to the reference category 'large firms' (more than 1000 employees).
Marginal Transaction Costs
The positive coefficient of the variable 'log of annual verified emissions' (logverem) in Table 3 indicates that MRV transaction costs are positively correlated with the amount of annual emissions, as expected. The coefficient is greater than zero and smaller than one (p-value: 0.01).
This implies that there are economies of scale in the MRV process because the observed MRV transaction costs increase at a lower rate than emissions. Therefore, MRV transaction costs per 
Average Transaction Costs
The combination of large fixed costs and non-zero marginal MRV transaction costs for companies with more than 249 employees also leads to pronounced differences in average MRV transaction costs, as predicted by model (1) in Table 3 Jaraite et al. (2010) , average MRV transaction costs are higher for companies with small amounts of annual emissions when compared to companies with larger amounts of annual emissions.
Robustness of Results
Four regressions are reported in Table 3 . Column (1) reports a weighted maximum likelihood random effects regressionwith jackknife standard errors. Weihts are applied to correct a potential bias towards larger firms in the sample. Column (2) reports a random effects regression with robust standard errors and additional interaction terms. Column (3) reports a random effects regression with additional year indicator variables in order to test for potential time trends in the data. Column (4) reports a random effects regression where the largest 1% of companies (in terms of annual emission) is omitted from the sample as an additional robustness check.
Regression (1) (2) and (3), and larger when compared to regression (4) which omits the largest companies. This implies that weighting is essential in order to avoid a potential bias of results.
The insignificant interaction term between the indicator variable for utility companies and the log of verified emissions (dutil_logver) in regression (2) questions the hypothesis that marginal MRV transaction costs differ for utility companies when compared to other sectors. The insignificant year indicator variables (11.year, 12.year) in regression (3) imply that there are no time trends in MRV transaction costs after inflation adjustment.
Limitations
As the paper uses self-reported data on MRV transaction costs, there is some ambiguity regarding the accurateness of the reported costs. The limited number of available observations and the presence of time-invariant variables (e.g. sector or firm size) impose further limitations with respect to model choice and estimation. However, the effects of main interest are highly robust throughout various model specifications. These effects are (1) the positive correlation of annual verified emissions and MRV transaction costs for 'larger' companies (more than 249 employees),
(2) the differences in 'fixed' MRV transaction costs for small companies (1-249 employees) as well as for utility vs. non-utility companies, and (3) zero marginal MRV transaction costs for 12 small companies. It is possible that additional effects could have been observed if a richer dataset had been available. Examples are a possible non-linear pattern in MRV transaction costs or more detailed effects with respect to firm size and type in connection with 'fixed', marginal, and average MRV transaction costs.
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The empirical picture sketched above has four important implications. Firstly, MRV transaction costs are positively correlated with the amount of annual emissions of larger companies (more than 249 employees). This implies that marginal MRV transaction costs are non-zero with possible negative consequences for economic efficiency, as already discussed in literature (Mundaca et al., 2013) . Secondly, the result implies that there are economies of scale in the MRV process. The estimated coefficient of the independent variable 'log of annual verified emissions' (logverem) is significantly larger than zero but also significantly lower than one (p-value: 0.01).
Thirdly, 'fixed' MRV transaction costs are lower for utility companies when compared to other A possible solution to the problem of large average burdens by MRV transaction costs for smaller companies would be the exclusion (or opt-out) of these. This, however, would undermine the effectiveness of the ETS as less sources of greenhouse gas emissions would be covered by the system after an opt-out of small companies. Thus, an out-out provision can be expected to increase administrative efficiency by reducing average MRV transaction costs. However, this will occur at the expense of a decreased coverage of polluters and a potential decrease in economic efficiency. 7 Thus, MRV transaction costs play an important role for policy design among other aspects. 8 This represents a trade-off between broad coverage of emissions and the avoidance of large MRV transaction costs per unit of emissions for some regulated companies.
A possible way to decrease transaction cost burdens while preserving effectiveness and broad coverage of regulation would be a strict 'upstream' policy design (Joas & Flachsland, 2014; Kerr & Duscha, 2015) . In the EU ETS, regulation takes place at the installation level in an 'end of the pipe' manner. This makes the inclusion of small installations necessary. Under upstream regulation (as interpreted here), the carbon content of intermediate products (e.g. fossil fuels) is 'priced' by the upstream regulation system in the moment the products are put on the market (Kerr & Duscha, 2015) . In this case, greenhouse gas emissions are 'priced' at the source and not at the level of final (commercial) consumers. In this situation, the overall prices of carbonintensive intermediate products incorporate the carbon price in case the products are resold. Such an approach is applicable to the energy sector and has been included in the design of the Australian carbon pricing scheme (Jotzo, 2012) which was repealed in July 2014.
Under upstream regulation, many businesses would not need to be actively covered by cap-andtrade, i.e. in cases when fossil fuels are purchased to fuel small or medium sized combustion installations. These companies would not be required to carry out MRV activities which would reduce overall transaction costs. Such a design could help to increase the administrative efficiency of climate policy and would offer the option of a broader indirect coverage of polluters, e.g. small businesses or additional sectors such as transportation.
Transaction costs have been assessed in the same manner as MRV costs for the additional categories of "transaction costs for trading", and "information costs." An additional option "no such costs" and an option to indicate that the surveyed person cannot answer the question has been provided in order to ensure that different types of transaction costs can be distinguished and that all relevant information on transaction costs are gathered.
Appendix A2: Calculation of Weights
To avoid biased results due to a domination of large firms in the regression, weights are applied.
Weights are calculated on the basis of the ex-ante probability that firm will participate in the survey ( = 1). Given firms in the population, this probability is defined by ( = 1) = 1/ . A second component is related to the self-selection of firms that actually participate in the survey. Thus, the probability of participation ( = 1| = 1) is estimated by using a probit model that encompasses the dependent variables 'log of verified emissions' (logverem) and the activity types, as reported in the official compliance data. Weights are described by = 1/ ( = 1) × ( = 1| = 1). * The number of companies is not equal to the sum calculated over the years since many companies are covered in more than one year. 
